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NOAH SACHS"' 
The Mescalero Apache Indians and 
Monitored Retrievable Storage of 
Spent Nuclear Fuel: A Study in 
Environmental Ethics 
ABSTRACT 
The proposal of the Mescalero Apache Indians of New Mexico to host 
a nuclear waste storage facility raised difficult questions about 
political sovereignty, environmental justice, and democratic consent. 
While the proposal had numerous drawbacks and deserved to be 
opposed, many of the arguments used against it were conceptually 
flawed and paternalistic. Arguments decrying bribery of a poor 
community were particularly weak, while those criticizing targeting 
of Indian tribes by the United States government and coercion of 
tribal members by the Mescalero leadership had more merit. The core 
ethical arguments should be separated from the rhetoric so that 
policy makers, Native Americans, environmentalists, and industry 
leaders can better evaluate similar projects in the future. 
INTRODUCTION 
In April 1996, the five year effort of the Mescalero Apache 
Indians of South-Central New Mexico to host a Monitored Retrievable 
Storage (MRS) facility for spent nuclear fuel was derailed due to contract 
disputes between the Tribe and a consortium of nuclear utilities. The 
Mescalero leadership sought the MRS, an above-ground facility intended 
for interim storage of over 20,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel for up 
to 40 years/ for the money and jobs the project would have brought to 
the Tribe. 
The breakdown in negotiations over the MRS and the apparent 
end to the project, at least in its current form, provide an opportunity to 
critically assess the ethical and political controversies surrounding the 
MRS. Proposals to site incinerators, chemical treatment facilities, and 
other noxious· facilities on native lands are being advanced with 
"' Noah Sachs is a student at Stanford Law School. 
1. See Elaine Hiruo, Long-term Financing Decisions Delayed So Utilities, Mesct~leros Start 
Licensing, NUCLEAR FuEL, July 3, 1995, at 17. Spent nuclear fuel refers to the fuel rods taken 
out of a nuclear reactor following the process of nuclear fiSSion inside the reactor. 
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increasing frequency, and the Mescalero case provides important lessons 
for policy makers as they evaluate similar future proposals involving 
poor communities. Policy makers, business leaders, and activists need to 
sort through the heated rhetoric that surrounds such projects in o~der to 
identify the core values and principles that are at stake. 
From the standpoint of environmental ethics, the Mescalero case 
was extraordinarily difficult. In the last decade, a consensus has evolved 
on the need to address issues of environmental justice-the pattern of 
poor and minority communities being disproportionately harmed by 
environmental hazards-in assessing environmental projects and their 
impacts. Many opponents of the Mescalero MRS proposal placed it in the 
context of the history of oppression of indigenous peoples and the history 
of Indian involvement in United States nuclear programs. At the same 
time, the affirmative Mescalero vote in favor of the facility and the 
substantial sum of money the Mescalero stood to receive change the 
ethical equation. Value judgments must include a strong presumption 
that poor communities can weigh costs and benefits for themselves and 
chart their own future. 
This article explores the ethical, political, and technical controver-
sy surrounding the MRS and concludes that while the Mescalero MRS 
was not in the national interest, many of the arguments used to oppose 
the facility were conceptually flawed and unduly paternalistic. The 
economic justice argument that the proposal represented bribery of a 
poor community was among the weaker arguments against the MRS, 
whereas arguments that were less frequently voiced were stronger. These 
more persuasive criticisms included the incompatibility of the MRS with 
United States spent fuel disposal policy, the federal government's 
targeting pf Indian tribes to host the MRS, the imposition of harms on 
New Mexico residents who would not be compensated, and the coercive 
nature of the tribal decision-making process. 
Several sections of this article are favorable to the Mescalero MRS 
project and some are more critical because the article attempts to separate 
complicated debates into individual arguments in order to assess their 
merits. While supportive of a community's right to investigate and host 
hazardous waste projects if it believes such projects will be beneficial to 
it, this article is critical of the decision-making process in this particular 
case, as well as of the national policy impacts of the Mescalero MRS. 
Sorting through the arguments that have been advanced on both sides of 
the debate is a challenging task. The difficult questions raised by the 
proposal about procedural and distributional equity, sovereignty and 
political jurisdiction, and the nature of democratic consent have no easy 
answers. 
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HISTORY OF THE MRS PROGRAM 
The origins of the Mescalero proposal date back to the Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982,2 the most important legislation 
governing present nuclear waste disposal policy. The NWP A mandated 
that the Department of Energy (OOE) conduct parallel searches in the 
eastern and western United States for a site for a permanent geologic 
repository for spent nuclear fuel. It also mandated that the Secretary of 
Energy begin to dispose of the nation's spent nuclear fuel by January 31, 
1998.3 As an interim measure, the NWPA contained a provision for the 
Secretary of Energy to "complete a detailed study of the need for and 
feasibility of, and shall submit to the Congress a proposal for, the 
construction of one or more monitored retrievable storage facilities for 
high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel."4 
In 1987, Congress amended the NWPA to halt DOE's parallel 
search for a repository and mandated that Yucca Mountain, Nevada be 
the only site that DOE investigate.5 The 1987 NWPA amendments also 
authorized the creation of the Office of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator 
(ONWN) within the Executive Office of the President6 to "attempt to 
reach a proposed agreement between the United States and any such 
State or Indian tribe specifying the terms and conditions under which 
such State or tribe would agree to host a repository or monitored 
retrievable storage facility within such State or reservation."7 The 
Nuclear Waste Negotiator was authorized to negotiate a compensation 
2. 42 u.s.c. §§ 10101-10270 (1994). 
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(5)(B) (1994). 
4. 42 U.S. C.§ 10161 (b)(l) (1994). In 1985, DOE announced three candidate MRS sites 
in Tennessee, but the state successfully sued for an injunction barring DOE from submitting 
the proposal to Congress. After the injunction expired, the state submitted a notice of 
disapproval to Congress, terminating the proposal. See DoUG EASTERUNG & HOWARD 
KUNitEUl'HER, THE DILEMMA OF SITING A HIGH LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE REPosiTORY 70.71 
(1995). 
5. See 42 u.s.c. § 10172 (1994). 
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 10242(a) (1994). 
7. 42 U.S.C. § 10243(a)(l)(B) (1994). At the time of the 1987 amendments, there were 
approximately 19,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel from civilian nuclear power plants. 
See Jon D. Erickson et al., Monitored Retrievable Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel in Indian Country: 
Liability, Sovereignty, and Socioeconomics, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 73, 74 (1994). While the 
legislation authorized the Nuclear Waste Negotiator to seek hosts for a repository as well 
as an MRS, in practice the Negotiator focused on the siting of an MRS. See EASTERUNG & 
KUNREI..ITHER, supra note 4, at 71. 
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package for final acceptance of the MRS facility,8 and Congress had to 
approve any agreement.9 Though created in 1987, the position of Nuclear 
Waste Negotiator went unfilled until1990.10 
In order to encourage participation, David Leroy, the first Nuclear 
Waste Negotiator, made stuQ.y grants available to allow communities to 
obtain information from whatever source they wished about the benefits 
and drawbacks of the MRS.11 In October 1991, the Mescalero Apache Tribe 
was the first among sixteen Indian tribes12 and four communities13 who 
applied for the initial $100,000 Phase I study grants from the ONWN.14 It 
was the first among eight Indian tribes who applied for Phase II-A funding 
of $200,000.15 Two of the non-Indian communities were interested in 
proceeding to Phase II-A but were blocked by their state govemors.16 In 
August 1993 the Mescalero were the first to apply for a Phase 11-B grant of 
$2.8 million from the ONWN, a grant which carried the expectation of 
sustained discussions with the ONWN.17 Before the grant was disbursed, 
8. As a baseline, the NWP A authorized the host state or tribe to receive $5 million per 
year prior to the shipment of waste and $10 million per year during the operational phase 
of the MRS. See 42 U.S.C. §'10173(a) (1994). The Negotiator was free to negotiate a package 
in excess of these figures. See EAsTERLING &: KUNREUTHER, supra note 4, at 72. While the Act 
authorized negotiations only with states or tribes, the Negotiator allowed local jurisdictions 
to apply for study grants under the condition that their state governor would have veto 
power over the grant application. See id. at 72. 
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 10243(d)(3)(A) (1994). 
10. See EAsTERLING &: KUNREUTHER, supra note 4, at 72. 
11. See id. 
12. Phase I applications were received from: Mescalero Apache (NM), Chickasaw 
Indian Nation (OK), Prairie Island Indian Community (MN), The Sac and Fox Nation (OK), 
Yakima Indian Nation (WA), Skull 'Valley Band of Goshute Indians (UTI, Ala-
bama/Quassarte Tribe (OK), Eastern Shawnee Tribe (OK), Lower Brule Sioux Tribe (SO), 
Ponca Tribe (OK), Ft. McDermitt Paiute Shashone [sic] Tribe (NV and OR), Tetlin Village 
Council (AK), Akhiok-Kaguyak Inc./ Akhiok Traditional Council (AK), Apache Development 
Authority (OK), Absentee Shawnee (OK), and Caddo Tribe (OK). See Erickson et al., supra 
note 7, at 81. 
13. The non-Indian communities were Grant County (NO), Fremont County (WY), San 
Juan County (UTI, and Apache County (AZ). ld. 
14. The Mescalero had previously examined a nuclear waste storage proposal in 
response to' a DOE request for a host for a temporary, low-level radioactive waste storage 
facility associated with the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant near Carlsbad. See Storage of Spent 
Nuclear Fuel: Hearing of the House Oversight and Investigations Subcomm., House Natural 
Resources Comm., 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter Fred Peso Testimony] (statement of 
Fred Peso, Mescalero Tribe Vice President). 
15. Mescalero Apache (NM), Skull Valley Goshute (UTI, Ft. McDermitt Tribe (OR and 
NV), Ponca/Tonkawa (OK), Eastern Shawnee Tribe (OK), Prairie Island Indians (MN), Ute 
Mountain Ute Tribe (CO), Miami Tribe (OK). See Erickson et al., supra note 7, at 81. 
16. The non-Indian communities were San Juan County (UTI and Fremont County 
(WY). See EAsTERLING &: KUNREUTHER, supra note 4, at 73. 
17. The Fort McDermitt Tribe applied for the Phase li-B grant five days after the 
Mescalero. See Erickson et al., supra note 7, at 81. 
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however, Senator Jeff Bingaman of New Mexico sponsored a successful 
amendment to the 1993 energy and water appropriations bill that effective-
ly barred any further funding for study giants to tribes or states, ending the 
federal role in the Mescalero MRS proposal.18 
Meanwhile, the storage situation for spent nuclear fuel at many 
of the United States' 110 nuclear reactors was becoming worse as cooling 
basins at many reactors neared capacity. Utility proposals to expand 
storage space were sometimes blocked by nearby communities.19 The 
Department of Energy has estimated that 32 reactor sites will need 
additional storage capacity by the end of the century,20 and existing 
reactors are expected to generate more than 80,000 metric tons of spent 
nuclear fuel under their current licenses. 21 
Frustrated by the delays and politics of the federal MRS project, 
the Mescalero tribal council initiated direct contacts with nuclear utilities 
in December 1993, regarding building a private MRS on the Mescalero 
reservation.22 Eventually, 33 utilities, led by Northern States Power of 
Minnesota, discussed the proposal with the Mescalero during 1994.23 
18. The amendment stated that no study grants could be disbursed unless "the Nuclear 
Waste Negotiator has first certified to the Secretary of Energy that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that agreement can be reached among all of the relevant governmental officials 
in the vicinity of any proposed site." EASTERLING & KUNREUTHER, supra note 4, at 74. When 
the appropriations bill went to conference, conferees voted to bar use of the Nuclear Waste 
Fund for study grants. Because DOE did not receive an appropriation from general revenues 
for study grants, the program was effectively canceled. See id. 
19. The lead utility in the Mescalero negotiations, Northern States Power of Minnesota, 
became interested in the Mescalero option when its proposal to expand storage capacity at 
its Prairie Island nuclear facility was opposed by environmental groups, Native Americans, 
and state legislators. See Luther J. Carter, The Mescalero Option, BULL. OF mE ATOMIC 
SCIENTisTs, Sept. 1994, at 11. 
20. See Elaine Hiruo & Mike Knapik, Mounting Spent Fuel Storage Concerns Show Time 
May Be Ripe for Private MRS, NUCLEAR FuEL, Mar. 28, 1994, at 1. 
21. Id. This is much more than the Mescalero MRS would handle, meaning that some 
additional at-reactor or centralized storage would have been needed even if the Mescalero 
facility had been built. 
22. See Background Memorandum on the Letter of Intent Between Utilities and the Mescalero 
Apache Tribe on the Spent Fuel Storage Project Qan. 25, 1995)(on file with NAT. RESOURCES J.) 
[hereinafter Background Memorandum). 
23. See Elaine Hiruo, Commercial Storage Venture Faces Life-or-Death Deadline for Success, 
NUCLEAR FuEL, Apr. 25, 1994, at 28-29. According to a preliminary business plan drafted in 
1994, the Mescalero would have majority ownership in the venture. The business plan 
outlined a four phase Action Plan leading to completion of the MRS by 2001. Phase 1 
entailed establishing a planning team, identifying needed licenses and approvals, and 
preparing a budget and schedule. In Phase 2, the utility partners would have signed a 
negotiated contract with the Mescalero. Phase 3 would have entailed preparation of a license 
application with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and development of a transportation 
plan. Phase 4, expected to last between 1996 and 2001, would have involved obtaining an 
NRC license, beginning and completing construction, and resolving any challenges or 
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The tribal council and the utilities drafted a Letter of Intent in December 
1994, but in a January 31, 1995 referendum, the Mescalero voted 490 to 
362 against further negotiations.24 The tribal leadership, which supported 
the venture, organized a petition drive for a revote, .and on March 9, 1995 
the Mescalero reversed themselves and voted 593 to 372 in favor of the 
project.25 Negotiations over the design and financing of the facility 
continued throughout 1995 and early 199626 until they were broken off 
in April 1996.27 
THE TRIBE AND THE FACILITY 
Understanding the ethics and politics of the controversy requires 
some understanding of the Tribe's motivations. The 3,000 Mescalero 
Apache Indians live on a 720 square mile reservation in South-Central 
New Mexico, 125 miles south of Albuquerque and just 40 miles from the 
ap~ls. See Betsy Tompkins, Possibilities for Private Facility Gain Momentum, NUCLEAR NEws, 
June 1994, at 28. · 
24. See George Johnson, NucleRr Waste Dump Gets Tribe's Approval in Re-vote, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 11, 1995, at 6. 
25. Id. 
26. By June 1995, the consortium had shrunk to 23 utilities who were either equity part-
ners or interested in renting space in the MRS once it was built. See Hiruo, supra note 23, 
at :ZS..29. By April1996, the consortium, called the Mescalero Fuel Storage Umited liability 
Corporation, represented only eleven utilities. The exact reasons for the breakdown in 
negotiations have not been disclosed, but John Parkyn, chairman of the LLC Board of 
Managers, said in a statement that "[n}egotiations between the utilities and the Mescalero 
Apache Tribe have been very complex." He added that "[w)e were unable to reach 
agreement on key business and legal issues over a 24-month negotiating period." Elaine 
Hiruo, Mescalero-Utility Talks End, Joint Storage Project Crumbles, NUCLEONICS WEEK, Apr. 25, 
1996, at 5. 
27. Two events in the summer of 1996 raised the likelihood that an interim spent fuel 
storage facility may still be built, most likely on federal land. On July 23, the DC Circuit 
ruled that DOE had an obligation to take title to the nation's spent nuclear fuel by January 
31, 1998. The court rejected DOE's argument that it had no "statutory or contractual 
obligation'' to accept the waste from nuclear utilities in the absence of an operating 
repository or interim storage facility. Indiana Mich. Power Co. v. Department of Energy, No. 95-
1279, 95-1321, 95-1463, 1996 WL 408043 (D.C. Cir. July 23, 1996). With such a near-term 
deadline and no federal facility to store spent fuel, pressure on DOE to build an interim 
storage facility could mount. See Pamela Newman, DOE Must Take Waste in 1998, Federal 
Court Says, THE ENERGY DAILY, July 24, 1996. One week later, on July 31, the Senate passed 
S. 1936, authorizing the construction of an interim storage facility on the Nevada Test Site, 
on a vote of 63 to 37. The bill was heavily supported by the nuclear industry, which is eager 
to move spent fuel away from current storage facilities near reactors. See Pamela Newman, 
Senate Overwhelmingly Backs NucleRr Waste Overhaul, THE ENERGY DAlLY, Aug. 1, 1996. House 
action on the interim storage bill appears unlikely before the November election, and the 
White House has said that President Clinton is likely to veto the bill if it passed through 
Congress. See Michael Remez, Senate Approves Bill on Storing Spent NucleRr Fuel in Nevada: 
Vote Indicates Issue Still Unresolved, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 1, 1996, at Al. 
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Trinity Test Site where the nuclear age began.28 The Mescalero tribe is 
headed by a President, Wendell Chino, who has been in power for over 
30 years,29 and an elected tribal council that is both government and 
board of directors for the Tribe's business ventures.30 The Tribe has 
developed a number of successful business operations, including a luxury 
hotel and casino, a ski resort, a golf course, a cattle ranch, and a 
sawmm.:n Chino is often quoted as saying, ''The Navajos make rugs, the 
Pueblos make pots, and the Mescaleros make money."32 
While the business ventures have helped to raise the living 
standards of the Tribe, the Mescalero are still a poor people. Unemploy-
ment has hovered around ·30 percent during the 1990s,33 and according 
to the 1990 census, the median household income of the New Mexico 
Mescalero was $14,364, compared to $14,515 for all Indians and $35,225 
for Americans as a whole.34 In 1989, 47.9 percent of the Tribe in New 
Mexico lived below the federal poverty level.35 The Tribe was initially 
attracted to the MRS because of the study grant money (which did not 
have to be spent on actually studying the proposal), and because of the 
large influx of cash the project would bring in. The MRS was estimated 
to cost $100 million to build,36 and it might have grossed $2 billion or 
28. See Michael Satchell, Dances With Nuclear Waste, U.S. NEWS AND WORW REP., Jan. 
8, 1996, at 29. 
29. Chino has been re-elected more than a dozen times. See Carter, supra note 19, at 11. 
30. See Thomas W. Uppman, On Apache Homeland, Nuclear Waste Seen as Opportunity, 
WASH. POST, June 28, 1992, at A3. 
31. The 440-room resort and convention center, the Inn of the Mountain Gods, contains 
the casino and offers golf, tennis, and guided big-game hunting. The ski resort, Ski Apache, 
is the second-largest winter sports center in the Southwest and draws approximately 300,000 
visitors per year. The Tribe owns 7,000 head of cattle and operates a metal fabrication plant 
that produces containers for low-level radioactive waste. See Satchell, supra note 28, at 29. 
32. Robert Bryce, Nuclear Waste's Last Stand: Apache Land, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 
2, 1994, at 8. 
33. See id. See also Mescaleros to Vote Again on Private SF Storage Site, NUCLEAR WASTE 
NEWS, Mar. 3, 1995, at 8. · 
34. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION: 
CHARACTERISTICS OF AMERICAN INDIANS BY TRIBE AND LANCUACE 600 (1994)(CP-3--
7)(hereinafter AMERICAN INDIAN CENSUS]; U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE; BUREAU OF CENSUS, 
1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION: THE SOciAL AND EcoNOMIC CHARACTERISTICS 23 (1993) (CP-2-
1). 
35. See AMERICAN INDIAN CENSUS, supra note 34. 
36. Different sources provide different estimates for construction costs and potential 
profits for the Tribe. Hiruo, supra note 23, at 28-29; Hiruo & Knapik, supra note 20, at 1, 
report $100 million in construction costs for a 10,000 metric ton facility. Construction, 
revenue and profit estimates are mostly conjecture given that the project did not advance 
beyond preliminary stages. 
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more over the 40 year life of the project.37 The tribal leadership estimat-
ed that the Tribe would receive $250 million in direct and indirect 
benefits from the project over 40 years.38 The leadership also argued that 
the MRS would provide high-wage jobs to younger Tribe members, who 
are increasingly leaving the reservation.39 According to President Chino, 
"[t]he storage of spent nuclear fuel is a 21st century industry with the 
attendant complement of high-tech, high-wage jobs not often available to 
Indian tribes."40 
Few details about the facility were released to the Tribe and 
public during the negotiations, and hard technical and financial data 
about the facility still remain scarce. The Mescalero MRS would have 
37. See Hiruo, supra note 1, at 17. See also Satchell, supra note 28, at 29. According to 
Wendell Chino, "With total revenues estimated at $2.3 billion over 40 years, the Mescalero 
Apache temporary spent fuel storage project is the largest rural economic development 
opportunity in New Mexico history." Background Memorandum, supra note 22, at 11; 
38. See Background Memorandum, supra note 22, at 8. Some reports indicate that the Tribe 
would receive up to $25 million per year, but that appears to be gross revenues, not profits. 
See Bryce, supra note 32, at 8. The Mescalero leadership estimated $64 million in lease 
payments over the life of the project, plus dividend payments from the Facility Corporation 
that would be divided 60 percent to the Tribe and 40 percent to the utility companies that 
have partial ownership of the project. See Background Memorandum, supra note 22, at 4. 
39. According to the 1990 Census, 50 percent of the Mescalero Apache Indians in New 
Mexico are under 19.1 years of age. The median age for American Indians as a whole is 23.7 
years. See AMERICAN INDIAN CENSUS, supra note 34, at 250 (Census 1990. Table 7: General, 
Family, and Household Characteristics of Selected American Indian Tribes: 1990). In 1993, 
Fred Peso, the Tribe's Vice President, wrote a letter to Kathleen McGinty, Director of the 
White House Office on Environmental Policy, stating that "[t]he Mescalero tribal council is 
firmly committed to identifying business ventUres which promise to be profitable, self-
sustaining and that can provide quality jobs and professional opportunities for our 
children." Mary O'Driscoll, Mescaleros Seeks (sic] White House Support in Battle with Bingaman, 
THE ENERGY DAILY, Oct. 13, 1993. Opponents charge that the Mescaleros would get only the 
low-paying service jobs associated with the facility while non-Indians would hold the high-
paying technical and managerial jobs. See Reese Erlich, Indians Press Clinton to Halt Waste 
Storage, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 25, 1992, at 8. 
40. Randel D. Hanson, Indian Burial Grounds for Nuclear Waste, xvi MULTINATIONAL 
MONITOR 21 (Sept. 1995). The tribal leadership assumed that tribal members would fill sixty 
percent of the jobs at the MRS, with $3 million in employment benefits over the life of the 
project. Background Memorandum, supra note 22, at 8. However, the Letter of Intent called for 
employment of "members of the Tribe on a priority basis for positions [for] which they are 
qualified based on training and/ or experience." Letter of Intent Between Mescalero Apache Tribe 
and Utilities 10 (Dec. 20, 1994) (on file with the NAT. RESOURCES J.) [hereinafter Letter of 
Intent]. Very few tribal members would have been qualified for the technical work on the 
MRS. The 1990 Census reports that less than one percent of the Mescalero in New Mexico 
have a bachelors degree or higher. See AMERICAN INDIAN CENSUS, supra note 34, at 429 
(Table 9, Educational and Labor Force Characteristics of Selected American Indian Tribes: 
CENsus 1990). According to the Letter of Intent, the Facility Corporation would also have 
employed "members of the Tribe on a priority basis for positions [for] which they may 
become qualified based on training provided by the Facility Corporation." Letter of Intent, 
supra, at 10. 
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been a large, guarded structure that ·would have contained spent nuclear 
fuel in dry casks-steel and reinforced concrete casings that are in use at 
some reactor sites in the United States that are considered among the 
safest ways to store spent fuel.41 The facility and associated structures 
would have occupied about one square mile,42 on a section of the 
reservation that would have been chosen by the Tribe and approved by 
the joint Tribe/Utility Facility Corporation.43 In the transfer of the spent 
fuel from the rail car to the MRS, the spent fuel would not have been 
taken out of its shipping container,44 reducing the risk compared to 
repackaging the fuel for interim storage.45 The main direct risks would 
have been from leaking or damaged casks and transportation acci-
dents.46 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission would have licensed and 
inspected the MRS. The Mescalero leadership considered the MRS to be · 
an environmentally benign facility, "the world's most expensive 
warehouse, with elaborate security monitoring," according to Chino.47 
While the tribal leadership was in favor of the project from the 
beginning, there was a solid core of opposition within the Tribe as well. 
Rufina Laws, a Tribe member and MRS opponent who ran against Chino 
for President in 1993,48 organized a group called Humans Against 
Nuclear Waste Dumps to protest the MRS.49 According to Laws, "the 
Tribe is actively being obligated to agreements and contracts without the 
consent of the people. Many tribal members are opposed to siting nuclear 
waste storage on our homeland, for they believe it will be a violation of 
our sacred land and our sacred mountain, Sierra Blanca."50 The relation-
ship between the leadership and the MRS opponents became rancorous, 
and opponents have leveled a number of accusations of intimidation and 
41. See ARJUN MAKHIJANI & SC0Tr SALESKA, HIGH LEVEL DoLLARS, Low LEVEL SENSE 
49 (1992). 
42. See Lippman, supra note 30, at A3. 
43. See Background Memorandum, supra note 22, at 6. 
44. See Carter, supra note 19, at 11. See also Letter of Intent, supra note 40, at 5. The Letter 
of Intent envisioned use of 75 or 125 ton shipping casks, with some truck transportation if 
necessary to move the casks from railroad lines to the facility. Id. at 4. 
45. See Carter, supra note 19, at 11. 
46. This is an estimate of risks. No detailed drawings of the facility have ever been re-
leased, and no environmental or health impact studies have been released. 
47. Lippman, supra note 30, at A3. 
48. By the time of the election in November 1993 the Tribe had already applied for and 
received grants from the Nuclear Waste Negotiator. Chino defeated Laws by a vote of 391 
to 176. In the Vice Presidential race, Fred Peso defeated Donalyn Torres, another opponent 
of the MRS, by a vote of 333 to 211. See Matthew Wald, Nuclenr Storage Divides Apaches and 
Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1993, at A18. 
49. See Hanson, supra note 40, at 41. 
50. Id. at 21. 
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foul play against the leadership, casting doubt on the validity of the 
Tribe's firi.al vote in favor of the MRS.51 
DRAWBACKS OF THE MRS FOR U.S. NUCLEAR 
WASTE DISPOSAL POLICY 
While the major focus of this article is on the environmental 
ethics of the MRS proposal, it is important to discuss the technical and 
institutional drawbacks of the proposal for the already troubled U.S. 
nuclear waste disposal policy. These drawbacks would have been serious, 
and they represent some of the strongest policy arguments against the 
MRS. 
Nuclear waste is unlike other hazardous materials. The public 
fear surrounding it'l and the technical challenges it poses for storage 
and permanent disposal make any interim or long-term disposal solution 
difficult to plan and implement. In part because these challenges are so 
great and in part because of the expenditures required, the federal 
government has taken primary responsibility for long-term disposal of 
spent nuclear fuel.53 
One drawback of the Mescalero proposal was that it would have 
put over half of the spent fuel in the United States in a single private 
facility for several decades. By alleviating the near-term problem of spent 
fuel storage at reactors, the MRS may have taken the pressure off the 
federal government to seek sound long-term solutions to the waste 
problem. The MRS would have entailed transportation of spent fuel from 
reactor sites around the country to New Mexico with no long-term 
repository solution in sight.54 Moreover, utilities and their customers 
would have paid twice, as their lease and storage payments to the 
51. These accusations are discussed in more detail below in the section on the 
Mescalero votes. 
52. See PuBUC RBACUONS TO NUCLEAR WASTE: ClTizENS' VIEW OF RI!POSlTORY SITING 
(Riley E. Dunlap et al. eds., 1993), Pt. 1, for a good discussion of public attitudes. 
53. The NWP A gave responsibility for siting and characterizing a repository to the De-
partment of Energy. See 42 U,S.C. § 10132(a)-(b) (1994). See also LBAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, 
A NUCLEAR WASTE PRIMER 26-31 (1993) for a discussion of the responsibilities of various 
federal agencies for nuclear waste disposal. 
54. Since 1987, the only site that DOE has been allowed by law to investigate for a 
repository is Yucca Mountain in Nevada. While DOE is predicting an opening date of 2010 
for a repository, many analysts of the nuclear waste program believe that to be very opti-
mistic. Scientists have cited problems with the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain such 
as seismic and volcanic activity in the area, the potential that the repository could become 
flooded with water, and the potential that releases of carbon-14 could violate environmental 
standards. See MAKHIJANI &: SALESKA supra note 41, at 59-64. See also }AMES FLYNN ET AL., 
ONE HUNDRED CENTIJRmS OF SOLJTUDE: REDIRECTING AMERICA'S HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR 
WASTE POUCY 23-26 (1995). 
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Mescalero would have been in addition to the over six billion dollars55 
they have already paid into the federal Nuclear Waste Fund.56 
The Mescalero MRS would have been the largest above ground 
spent nuclear fuel storage facility in the United States.57 There are 
serious questions about the operation of a private facility by an Indian 
tribe with little experience with nuclear waste, despite NRC licensing and 
despite the technical assistance of nuclear utilities in its construction and 
operation. This is especially true since the Tribe was deeply divided over 
the merits of the facility and since the Tribe's leadership would have 
changed over the life of the project. The poverty of the Tribe, its remote 
location, and its lack of voice in the political process could have allowed 
utilities to skimp on some safety measures and procedures during 
construction and operation.58 The long-term safety of the facility was a 
key issue because of the potential that it could become de facto a 
long-term storage site for spent fuel.59 Though a 40 year lifetime was 
envisioned for the facility,60 it could have been used for 50 years or even 
longer given the problems with the siting and construction of a perma-
nent geologic repository and given the Riley principle that nuclear waste 
tends to stay where it is first put.61 
Many environmentalists, frustrated '!:>y the politically arbitrary 
selection of Yucca Mountain and the arbitrary deadlines that have been 
imposed on the disposal process, advocate at-reactor storage of spent fuel 
for as long as one hundred years.62 This would provide the federal 
55. See Hiruo & Knapik, supra note 20, at 1. 
56. The fund was set up in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to pay for the identification, 
characterization and construction of a repository or MRS. 42 U.S.C. § 10222 (1994). It has 
been financed by a one time charge for commercial high-level waste or spent nuclear fuel 
in existence before April1983 and a tenth of a cent per kilowatt-hour charge on electricity 
generated by nuclear power plants after April 1983. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra 
note 53, at 60. 
57. Its projected 20,000 metric ton capacity dwarfs the capacity of any individual 
storage pool at reactor sites. 
58. Though not disclosed to the Tribe, the Letter of Intent between the utilities and the 
tribal council provides for a nine-member Board of Directors to run the MRS, four of which 
would be from the Tribe, and five of which would be from the utilities. Further, the Letter 
of Intent provides for decision-making by majority rule of the Board of Directors. See Letter 
of Intent, supra note 40, at 9. 
59. See MAKHlJANI & SALFSICA, supra note 41, at 47. 
60. The Letter of Intent outlined penalties for utility customers if spent fuel remained 
in the MRS beyond the 40-year lifetime of the project. The penalties ranged from two times 
the annual storage fee for a 0-2 year delay in removing the fuel to five times the annual 
storage fee in the case of a 6-10 year delay in removing the fuel. See Letter of Intent, supra 
note 40, at 20. 
61. First coined by former South Carolina Governor Richard Riley. See Nuclear Waste, 
Not Here, Please, THE EcONOMIST, Nov. 26, 1994, at 31. 
62. See, e.g., MAKHIJANI & SALFSKA, supra note 41, at 105. 
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government with more time and increased know-how to construct a 
sound permanent repository.63 · 
The major benefit of this option relative to the MRS is that the spent 
fuel would have to be transported only once-from the reactor site to the 
permanent repository. Also, some of the shorter-lived and highly radioac-
tive components of spent nuclear fuel, such as strontium-90, krypton-85, 
and plutonium-241, would decay away and make transport and geologic 
disposal easier.64 There were not likely to be monetary savings from an 
MRS relative to a variety of other disposal scenarios, as a 1989 study by the 
federal MRS Commission concluded.65 Drawbacks of at-reactor storage 
include the need for continuous monitoring and security and ensuring 
safety, but two analysts have concluded that "[d)espite these concerns ... 
onsite storage is likely to be the least dangerous interim option until a 
long-term disposal method is developed."66 
It is beyond the scope of this article to take a comprehensive look 
at the history and prospects for nuclear waste disposal, but it is apparent 
that there is support for the position that the Mescalero MRS would not 
have been advantageous for the national spent fuel disposal effort on 
both technical and institutional grounds. In addition to these technical 
drawbacks, there were several disturbing ethical problems with the MRS. 
THE ETHICS OF THE FEDERAL ROLE IN THE MRS 
NEGOTIATION PROCESS 
In, assessing the ethics of the MRS proposal, the two phases of the 
project need to be considered separately. The first phase of the project 
involving federal negotiations with the Mescalero should be subjected to 
a higher standard of ethical scrutiny than the second, private phase of the 
project involving tribal negotiation with the consortium of nuclear 
utilities. Private parties may engage in private agreements that could be 
harmful to one or both parties. We should be more wary of the federal 
government, acting on behalf of the American people and thus implicat-
ing each of us in its decisions, subjecting any group to a potential harm, 
even with compensation. 
63. The nuclear industry has argued that it is better to have one centralized interim 
storage site rather than spent fuel storage at all of the reactor sites in the United States. This 
ignores the fact that every operating reactor will continue to produce intensely radioactive 
spent fuel that must be stored on site in order to cool even if spent fuel currently in storage 
is taken away to a central facility. See Don Hancock, Where is Nuclear Waste Going-Or 
Staying? 20 THE WORKBOOK 100, 103 (Southwest Research and Information Center, 
Albuquerque, N.M. 1995). 
64. See MAKHIJANI &: SA"\-ESI<A, supra note 41, at 106. 
65. Id. at 47. 
66. Id. at 107. 
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One of the most serious and legitimate ethical charges that can 
be brought against the federal government is that the process set up by 
the 1987 NWPA Amendments and the Office of the Nuclear Waste 
Negotiator favored an Indian tribe becoming the eventual host of an 
MRS. As discussed above, the non-Indian communities that applied for 
the initial study grants were overruled by their state governors. The 
tribes, however, could proceed with the process because they were not 
subject to the veto power of state governments.67 
Vernon Nelson, a spokesman for the ONWN, argued in 1992 that 
"we don't target anybody, we don't target tribes, we don't target states, 
we treat everyone equally and fairly." 68 The actions of the Nuclear 
Waste Negotiator belied this argument, however, and demonstrated that 
Indian tribes were seen from the beginning as likely hosts of the MRS. 
Not only were Indian tribes explicitly mentioned in the authorizing 
legislation, but in May, 1991, David Leroy, the first Nuclear Waste 
Negotiator, mailed letters to every tribal council in the United States 
explaining the MRS proposal and the study grants. Leroy spoke at the 
annual meeting of the National Congress of American Indians in 
December 1991 and touted the MRS proposal. He said to his audience 
that: 
[I]t is the Native American cultures of the continent which 
have long adhered to the concept of planning for many 
generations of future unborn children in the decisions that are 
made today .... With atomic facilities designed to safely hold 
radioactive materials with half-lives of thousands of years, it 
is the Native American culture and perspective that is best 
designed to correctly consider and balance the benefits and 
burdens of these proposals.69 
Had Congress simply passed a law mandating that an MRS be 
located on Indian land, even with compensation, there would have been 
a public uproar. The process that was set up by the 1987 amendments 
and the subsequent actions by the ONWN had the effect of achieving the 
same goal. 70 
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 10243(a)(l)(B) (1994). 
68. Katie Hickox, High-Level Nuke Dump Pits Indians Against Each Other, Governor King, 
Congress, STATES NEWS SERVICE, May 28, 1992. 
69. David H. Leroy, Federalism on Your Terms: An Invitation for Dialogue Government to 
Government, Remarks presented to the National Congress of American Indians, San 
Francisco, California (Dec. 4, 1991), at 8, 9. 
70. For example, the fact that so many more Indian tribes applied for the study grants 
relative to states and non-Indian communities suggests that the system encouraged Indian 
participation. 
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Targeting Indian tribes to host the MRS was particularly 
reprehensible from an ethical standpoint because of the long and often 
destructive history of Indian involvement in U.S. nuclear programs. 
Several U.S. nuclear facilities are located on or near Indian land, 
including Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Nevada Test Site71 
(where the United States conducted over 900 nuclear weapons tests), the 
Hanford Nuclear Reservation,72 and Yucca Mountain itself.73 Native 
Americans were heavily represented among uranium miners during the 
uranium boom of the 1950s and 1960s in Colorado, Utah, and New 
Mexico, a boom that was driven by demand for uranium for nuclear 
weapons and nuclear reactors.74 Native uranium miners were exposed 
to dangerous levels of radon, a uranium decay product. A number of 
uranium mill tailing piles, which are among the most hazardous nuclear 
wastes,75 have contaminated Indian lands.76 
Some environmentalists and policy makers based their objections 
to the Mescalero MRS squarely on the historical context of nuclear 
exploitation and general maltreatment of Indian tribes by the United 
States government. 77 According to Winona LaDuke, co-chair of the 
Indigenous Women's Network, "lnlative communities are focal points for 
the excrement of industrial society, a situation made possible by both the 
colonial relationship of the United States and Canada to Native peoples 
and general conditions of environmental racism in each country."78 Or, 
as Robert Bullard of the University of California put it, "[t]argeting 
71. See A SPECIAL COMM'N OF INT'L PHYsiOANS FOR TiiE PREvEN'nON OF NUCLEAR WAR 
AND TiiE INST. FOR ENERcY AND ENvTL. REsi!ARCH, NUCLEAR WASTELANDS: A GLOBAL GUIDE 
TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS I'RODUCI10N AND ITS HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS 202, 225 
(Arjun Makhijani et al., eds. 1995). 
72. OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACI1VE WASTE MGMT., DEP'T OF ENERGY, U.S. ENVIRON-
MENTAL AssESSMENT: REFERENCE REPOSITORY LocATION, HANFORD SITE, WASHINGTON 3-208 
(1986)(DOE/RW..()()70 1 of 2). 
73. Yucca Mountain is within the boundaries of the Nevada Test Site. 
74. See MAKHIJANI ET AL., supra note 71, at 113-126; Erickson et al., supra note 7, at 88-90. 
75. See MAKHIJANI ET AL., supra note 71, at 34-35. 
76. See id. at 121. Between 1955 and 1977, 15 tailings dams broke. In 1979, a dam hold-
ing back mill tailings waste at Church Rock, New Mexico, failed and released 94 million gal-
lons of mill tailings liquid into the Rio Puerco, which cuts through Navajo lands in New 
Mexico and Arizona. In Tuba City, Arizona, a mill tailings pile has contaminated ground-
water and threatens the Moenkopi Wash, the Hopi's only source of wa~r for irrigation.Id. 
77. See, e.g., Grace Thorpe, Our Homes are Not Dumps: Creating Nuclear Free Zones, 
Speech at the North American Workshop on Environmental Justice, Denver, Colorado (Mar. 
17, 1995) in http:/ /www.alphacdc.com/necona/homes.html. 
78. Winona LaDuke, A Society Based on Conquest Cannot be Sustained, in TOXIC STRUG-
GLES: THB THEoRY AND PRACI1CE OF ENVIRONMENTAL }USTICE 99, 101 (Richard Hofrichter ed., 
1993). 
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Native American land for disposal of wastes is a form of garbage impe-
rialism."79 
THE ETHICS OF COMPENSATION 
Some critics of the MRS proposal went a step further and argued 
that the voluntary process and the offer of compensation were themselves 
unethical because poor communities were being ''bought off' by the 
federal government. Senator Tom Daschle of South Dakota, a state with 
a large native population, said that the federal negotiating process for the 
MRS was "tantamount to bribery and the worst type of policy for the 
United States to be involved in."80 
This economic strain of environmental justice arguments is less 
compelling and crosses the line into paternalism. While assertions about 
bribery and economic exploitation were among the most frequently 
voiced claims against the MRS, they are weak for several reasons. 
First, given that the federal government wanted to build an MRS, 
the main alternative to voluntary negotiations and the lure of compensa-
tion was a compulsory siting process in which the federal government 
would choose a location for the MRS by fiat, whether on Indian or·non-
Indian land. But compulsory and coercive methods of siting hazardous 
facilities have been widely discredited on ethical and political grounds, 
especially in the wake of the congressional imposition of the repository 
program on Nevada81 and the political opposition this engendered.82 
Second, if a community has decided for itself that the benefits 
outweigh the costs of a facility, denying the community the facility on 
equity grounds (because it is poor or minority) undermines its opportuni-
ty to improve its own welfare. In the case of the MRS, it is important to 
remember that the project would have brought several million dollars per 
year to the Tribe. If the federal government blocked a non-nuclear 
economic development project of that magnitude on an Indian reserva-
tion, it would rightly be criticized. There is an element of paternalism in 
some environmental justice arguments that offends the ethical principle 
19. Robert Bullard, Environmental Justice for All, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMEN-
TAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 3, 17 (Robert Bullard ed., 1994). 
80. Bill Lembrecht, More People Opposing Dumps on Indian Land ••• Doubts Surface in 
Congress, ST. LoUIS POST DISPATCH, May 25, 1992, at 1B. 
81. See EASTERLING &i: KUNREUTHER, supra note 4, at 144-45. 
82. See }AMFS FLYNN ET AL., supra note 54, at 8-12. 
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that individuals and communities, rich or poor, should be free to consider 
and pursue economic options on their own. 83 
The tribal leadership expressed this belief forcefully. Decrying 
outsiders such as Greenpeace and the Natural Resources Defense Council 
who came to the reservation to speak against the MRS, Silas Cochise, a 
tribal official, said: ''These outsiders are ignorant. How dare they tell us 
how to live and what is good for us."84 Another tribal official, Jennifer 
Sundayman-Byers, echoed this view: ''They come to save the poor Indian 
from himself. This creates great anger and resentment. What do they 
know of our way of life?"85 
Keven Gover and Jana Walker, two Native American attorneys 
from Albuquerque, New Mexico, criticized economic paternalism in an 
article in the Colorado Law Review: 
Too often, the environmental community appoints itself the 
officious protector of the Indians ... To people like ourselves, 
Indians who have devoted our careers to the defense of Indian 
rights, this is unspeakably arrogant ... Much of the environ-
mental community seems to assume that, if an Indian commu-
nity decides to accept such a project, it either does not 
understand the potential consequences or has been bamboo-
zled by an unprincipled waste company. In either case, the 
clear implication is that Indians lack the intelligence to balance 
and protect adequately their own economic and environmental 
resources. 86 
In addition to the problem of paternalism, arguments that offers 
of compensation are inherently unethical can ring hollow because almost 
all analysts of the troubled U.S. nuclear waste policy have emphasized 
the importance of procedural equity in gaining the trust of communities. 
Perceptions of fairness depend as much on the decision-making processes 
83. Some opponents of the MRS object to this line of argument in the case of Indian 
tribes because the federal government had a role in making the tribes poor. They contend 
that the question of whether tribes can make economic decisions for themselves is too 
narrow, and the real issue is whether t~ federal government should provide resources so 
that tribes are not forced into such difficult decisions. For example, Erickson et al. have 
argued that "(t]he social and economic conditions of Indian country stem from the federally 
defined sovereignty of Indian nations. These conditions contribute to the willingness of 
some Indian tribes to study the MRS, while not one of 50 states will do so." Erickson et al., 
supra note 7, at 86. This view has some merit, but given the poverty on reservations and the 
~ote prospect that the federal government will substantially alleviate it, the question 
remains about how tribes may best seek economic development opportunities on their own. 
84. Satchell, supra note 28, at 29. 
85. Id. 
86. Kevin Gover &c Jana Walker, Escaping Environmental PaternRlism: One Tribe's Approach 
to Developing a Commercial Waste Disposal Project in Indian Country, 63 U. CoLO. L. REv. 933, 
942 (1992). 
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used in facility siting as on substantive issues of location and risk. As 
Doug Easterling and Howard Kunreuther have argued, the MRS 
provisions of the 1987 NWPA amendments were a model of procedural 
equity, especially in comparison to the coercive selection of Yucca 
Mountain in the same bill. The federal MRS negotiating process allowed 
potential hosts to back out of the process at any time and provided study 
grant funds so that potential host communities could obtain information 
from sources other than OOE.87 
In the context of hazardous facility siting, the public generally 
supports voluntary compensation schemes to a much greater extent than 
compulsory methods. Compensation schemes help to alleviate inequities 
between those who enjoy the benefits of a hazardous facility and those 
who bear the localized costs and risks. As one individual wrote to a 
Seattle newspaper, "[c]oating bitter pills with a bit a sugar would 
undoubtedly remove much opposition. It is when the undesirable is 
jammed down the throat without compensation that people feel unfairly 
treated."88 . 
THE ETHICS OF COMPENSATION-ANOTHER LOOK 
While compensation schemes in the context of facility siting are 
not inherently unethical, most people are not entirely comfortable with 
their results. Compensation schemes almost inevitably mean that poor 
communities will come forward to host hazardous facilities and negotiate 
for compensation. Poor and affluent communities alike may weigh costs 
and benefits in deciding whether to host a hazardous facility, but the 
level of compensation at which benefits outweigh costs will undoubtedly 
be lower for the poor communities. Indeed, one possible reason for public 
support of voluntary compensation schemes is that affluent voters know 
they can avoid hosting a hazardous facility while secure in conscience 
because a poor community freely chose to become a host. Thus, using 
compensation to alleviate distributional inequity, by offsetting localized 
costs with monetary benefits, often leads to a more global kind of 
inequity in which poor and minority communities end up with most of 
society's noxious facilities. 
These negative ethical implications of a voluntary siting process 
involving compensation are often overlooked by nuclear waste policy 
analysts. For example, a team of nine academic experts on Yucca 
Mountain recently criticized the selection process for that site as coercive 
87. EAs'rERUNG &; KUNREUJ'HBR, supm note 4, at 214-17. 
88. DAVID MORELL&; CHRISToPHER MAGORIAN, SITING HAzARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES: 
LocA~ 0PPOSJTION AND THl! MYTH OF PREI!MrnON 167 (1983). 
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and politically arbitrary and at the root of the current problems with the 
project.89 They recommended employing a· voluntary site selection 
process in which "Congress should mandate that no community be 
forced to accept a repository against its will ... . "90 They further argued 
that "[a] voluntary siting program must offer sufficient benefits to 
potential host communities and regions so that their residents feel their 
situation has improved over the status quo."91 This approach, however, 
could very well result in suboptimal siting from a technical standpoint 
and the siting of a repository in an impoverished minority community, 
possibly on Indian land. 
The potential for burdens to inevitably fall to the poor under 
compensation schemes raised the ire of environmentalists and engen-
dered much of the opposition to the Mescalero MRS. What opponents 
were really criticizing, however, was the fact of inequality itself-the 
inequality and poverty that drives poor communities to volunteer to host 
facilities shunned by more affluent communities. But we cannot have it 
both ways. We cannot advocate open processes involving fair compensa-
tion and at the same time oppose the projects when poor communities 
step forward to host the facility and obtain compensation. 
There are no easy answers to this conundrum. What was at issue 
in the Mescalero case and in facility siting in general was a classic tension 
between equity and efficiency. If the goal is to share environmental 
burdens equally, then affluent communities must either be forced to 
accept hazardous facilities or large amounts of compensation may need 
to be offered to them even if a poorer community is willing to take a 
lesser amount of compensation. From an economic standpoint, this is an 
inefficient, needless expenditure of resources, but it could potentially be 
justified on the ethical grounds of burden-sharing. The ethical case for 
allowing poor communities to pursue projects that they believe will be 
beneficial for them is even more compelling, however. In most cases, the 
ethical balance should tip in that direction. 
Potential harm to communities that accept facilities such as an 
MRS can be mitigated by retaining the primacy of technical and safety 
criteria in the selection process rather than using cost as the sole or even 
primary criterion. Easterling and Kunreuther have argued that communi-
ties must be allowed to negotiate not only over the amount of compensa-
tion but also over the design and procedures for operation of the nuclear 
waste facility.92 This makes ethical sense as well as practical sense, as 
straight cash compensation schemes are often perceived as bribes by the 
89. See FLYNN ET AL., supra note 54, at 17. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. See EASTERUNG &t KUNREUTHER, supra note 4, at 183. 
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communities affected. The two researchers found that among citizens 
opposed to the siting of a nuclear waste repository, offering straight cash 
compensation can actually increase opposition because, to these citizens, 
the offer appears to violate the notion that life is special and cannot be 
bought and sold.93 
David Leroy, the Nuclear Waste Negotiator, seems to have 
recognized this point, at least in his rhetoric: "When I speak of benefits, 
I am not talking about traveling from airport to airport with a bag of 
money. The American people will not be motivated by fiscal bribery. 
Before any nuclear facility siting negotiation can hope to succeed, affected 
stakeholders must satisfy themselves on all conceivable issues of safety, 
control, technology, and acceptability."94 
. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE-WHEN PATERNALISM MAY BE 
JUSTIFIED IN FACILITY SITING 
There are two exceptions to this general rule that poor commu-
nities such as the Mescalero should be able to negotiate for potentially 
hazardous facilities when they believe it will improve their economic wel-
fare. 
First, the economic options available to poor or oppressed 
communities can be so circumscribed that the word "choice" no longer 
applies to their decisions. Is a community in abject poverty really "free" 
to engage in complex monetary transactions with wealthy corporations? 
Or is such a community caught between Scylla and Charybdis--the moral 
equivalent of making a decision at gunpoint? In these cases, there may 
be a role for outside groups or government entities to prevent what 
amounts to economic exploitation. This type of argument was often made 
during the Mescalero MRS controversy. Representative Bill Richardson 
(D-NM) lamented that he was concerned for Indian tribes ''because there 
is [sic] such massive economic problems on the reservations. They are 
being limited in their economic options to nuclear waste."95 Lance 
Hughes, Executive Director of the Oklahoma-based Native Americans for 
a Clean Environment, has argued that the Bureau of Indian Affairs has 
failed miserably in its mandate to foster economic development on 
reservations. As a result, according to Hughes, tribes are more apt to 
entertain questionable proposals from waste companies.96 
93. Id. at 182. 
94. EAsTERUNG & KUNRI!Ul1iER, supra note 4, at 215. 
95. Hickox, supra note 68. 
96. Telephone Interview with Lance Hughes, Executive Director, Native Americans for 
a Clean Environment (March 18, 1996). 
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The key ethical question, then, is whether the Mescalero were in 
some way "forced" by economic circumstances into seeking the MRS. In 
. one sense they were, because if their per capita income were two or three 
times its present amount it is very unlikely that they would have pursued 
the MRS project. On the other hand, it is difficult to argue that the 
Mescalero Apache Tribe is at a level of poverty which provided no other 
options besides the MRS. Indeed, the Tribe runs a number of 
multi-million dollar business ventures. In contrast to many environmen-
talists, Grace Thorpe, a member of the Sac and Fox Tribe, an opponent of 
the MRS program, and President of the National Environmental Coalition 
of Native Americans, acknowledges that the Mescaleros were not driven 
by economic circumstances to seek the MRS. ''The Mescalero don't need 
this nuclear waste," she said. ''They have a five-star resort, a casino, two 
ski lifts, forestry resources, and a sawmill."97 
The actions of the Mescalero leadership also undermine the 
argument that the Mescaleros were driven or forced to accept nuclear 
waste. Far from appearing remorsefully resigned to accept the MRS as a 
last resort to sustain the Tribe's livelihood, the leadership doggedly 
pursued the project for five years and aggressively engaged in negotia-
tions witK the nuclear utilities when the federal government cut off 
funding. There is some level of poverty below which consensual 
economic transactions might mask an exploitative relationship, but the 
Mescalero do not appear to fall into that category. 
The second situation in which it might prove unethical for 
government or private corporations to contract with poor communities 
to host hazardous facilities is when information constraints preclude 
informed consent. If the community does not have the proper information 
needed to make an informed decision, or if the community is denied such 
information, then the economic tranSaction can rise to the level of 
exploitation. This issue is discussed in detail below in the context of the 
two Mescalero votes. 
THE ETHICS OF THE PRIVATE MRS VENTURE 
The economic justice arguments used against the federal phase 
of the MRS proposal become even more untenable when applied to the 
private phase of the project. While the private phase of the MRS venture 
had a number of technical and institutional drawbacks for national spent 
fuel disposal policy as discussed above, it raised fewer ethical concerns 
than the federal phase of the project. To assert that the government 
should prevent private parties from negotiating contracts on the grounds 
97. Thorpe, supra note 77. 
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that one is poor and one is rich amounts to paternalism. The argument 
that the Mescalero have a right to enter ·into business contracts with 
corporations without having it characterized as an exploitative relation-
ship was summed up by Fred Peso, the Tribe's Vice President: "We 
believe the MRS ~ a business-a service provided in exchange for a profit 
to a willing customer by a willing seller."93 
Some analysts maintain that there never truly was a private phase 
of the MRS proposal because the federal government's fingerprints 
lingered on the proposal throughout the Mescalero's private negotiations 
with the nuclear utilities.99 In this view, the federal government initiated 
the Mescalero into the MRS process and, through the study grants, gave 
them the interaction with expert consultants that later allowed them to 
conduct negotiations with the nuclear utilities.100 Certainly, the necessity 
of obtaining a federal NRC license and state permits for the MRS meant 
that the government was never completely out of the picture during the 
private negotiations. 
But much of the criticism of the project stemmed from people not 
liking the outcome of an MRS ending up in a poor Indian community. 
The outcome-based consequentialist sentiment was that the proposal was 
just not right, regardless of whether the Tribe voted for it and perceived 
that it was in its interest. As the ~onomist Morris Silver has asserted, 
"[l]arge gains in utility ... are incapable of transforming moral wrong 
into moral right."101 To be sure, there are some examples of society 
placing moral limits on the right of private parties to negotiate contracts. 
For example, we prevent people from selling themselves into slavery to 
raise funds to feed their families, we have child labor laws, and we 
outlaw prostitution. Society imposes these limits not so much because the 
contracts may harm third parties, but because they violate societal moral 
standards. Even the simple case of one person buying another's place in 
a long line offends most people's ethical values. Though both parties to 
the transaction are made better off, and no one in the line is made worse 
off, most people believe that buying a place in line violates ethical 
concepts of justice and fair play. 
Though society has imposed some moral restraints on contracts, 
the ethical hurdles to barring private parties from entering into contracts 
must be placed very high to avoid paternalism. While the result of an 
MRS on Indian land may have been deplorable or undesirable to many 
98. Fred Peso Testimony, supra note 14. 
99. Telephone Interview with Duane Chapman, Professor of Resource Economics, 
Cornell University (March 18, 1996). 
100. Jd. 
101. MORRIS SILVER, FoUNDATIONS OF EcONOMIC }USTICB 142 (1989). 
902 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL [Vol. 36 
people, ethical qualms about this result did not justify outside interfer-
ence in the private venture between the Mescalero and the utilities. 
THE MESCALERO VOTES AND THE ISSUE 
OF INFORMED CONSENT 
The above analysis assumes that the Mescalero wanted the 
facility, weighed its costs and benefits, and had enough information to 
make an informed judgment about it. But the second, affirmative vote on 
the MRS was preceded by a negative vote just six weeks earlier, which 
raises questions about what decision the Mescalero really supported. The 
fact that the elected tribal leadership was unanimous in its support of the 
:MRS while there was significant opposition among unelected tribal 
members similarly raises questions about whether a democratic consensus 
ever existed in support of the MRS. If the votes were conducted in an 
atmosphere of intimidation or fear, then arguments about a community's 
right to make a decision for itself, while valid in general, are weakened 
in this case. 
Democratic consensus and fair processes are vital in cases of 
environmental ethics because environmental harms stemming from 
hazardous facilities can affect every member of a community. Building 
community support through honest dialogue has been found to be vital 
in cases of facility siting.102 The ethical arguments against paternalism 
and preventing poor communities from choosing among economic 
options fall apart if the community was hoodwinked, misled, or coerced 
by outsiders or its own leaders. 
There is indeed some evidence that coercion and intimidation 
were involved in securing the second vote on the MRS. One observer of 
the process said that Wendell Chino was so confident that the first tribal 
vote would support his position, and so angry when it went against him, 
that he launched a full-scale campaign to reverse the vote in a second 
referendum.103 
The Mescalero tribal constitution concentrates power .in the hands 
of the President, and President Chino vigorously supported the MRS. The 
President appoints the election committee, serves on the tribal council, 
heads the executive branch, chairs the court of appeals, and has veto 
102. See, e.g., MORELL &t MACORIAN, supra note 87, at 186-87. 
103. Telephone Interview with Don Hancock, Nuclear Waste Safety Program Director, 
Southwest Research and Information Center, Albuquerque, N.M. (Aug. 21, 1996). Indeed, 
the Letter of Intent signed on December 20, 1994 with the utilities appears to have assumed 
a speedy tribal approval process. It gave the utilities the right to terminate the project if the 
Tribe had not selected a site on the reservation for the MRS by July 31, 1995, allowing only 
a seven month window for approval. See Letter of Intent, supra note 40, at 15. 
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power over tribal council decisions.104 All election and referendum 
ballots, including the two votes on the MRS, are counted in secret.105 
The governmental structure of the Tribe dates back to the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934,106 which imposed tribal constitutions and 
established tribal councils on each Indian reservation.107 According to 
Easterling and Kunreuther, "[t]he council system replaced a much more 
consensus-based form of government under which decisions were made 
by chiefs or other elders with the input of the entire Tribe . . . . [l]t is 
possible for the elected representatives to consent to an MRS facility, even 
when it offends the wishes and values that predominate among tribal 
members."108 
David Morell and Christopher Magorian have similarly noted 
that "[o]ne of the biggest dangers [with compensation schemes] is the 
tendency of public officials ... to be concerned predominantly with the 
financial benefits that accrue to the town, whereas the residents of the 
town are likely to be most concerned about the risks of the facility and 
its safety features, not its property tax payments."109 This split in 
opinion appears to have existed among the Mescalero, as the voices of 
opposition were entirely concentrated among unelected members of the 
Tribe. The few MRS opponents who worked within the tribal administra-
tion were fired from their tribal jobs, 110 and experienced other repercus-
sions.111 
104. See Erickson et al., supra note 7, at 90-91. 
105. Id. at 90. 
106. 25 u.s.c. §§ 461-79 (1994). 
107. EASTERLING &: KUNREUTHER, supra note 4, at 217. 
108. Id. 
109. MORELL &: MAGORlAN, supra note 88, at 176. 
110. See Erickson et al., supra note 7, at 91. Rufina Laws said that when she first tried to 
get signatures in 1992 for a petition opposing the MRS, "some people told us straight out, 
'There's no way I'm going to sign that petition, because if my name appears on that 
petition, then I'm going to lose my job, and my wife is going to lose her job, and we're 
going to lose everything we have."' She added that "[w)e have a dictatorial gove~ment 
here," which, while elected, has ballots that are counted in secret "by an election board that 
is appointed to that position by the President of the Tribe. So it's not an unbiased group of 
people that's doing the tallying of the votes. I think that's one of the biggest reasons why 
we have retained the same tribal president, Mr. Chino, for nearly four decades." Beth Enson, 
New Mexico Women Activists: A Mescalero Apache Woman Takes on an Entrenched Tribal Govern-
ment to Fight a Plan for Nuclear Waste, 18 THE WORKBOOK 146, 149 (Southwest Research and 
Information Center, Albuquerque, N.M. (1993)). 
111. Telephone Interview with Duane Chapman, Professor of Natural Resources Eco-
nomics, Cornell University (Aug. 20, 1996). Professor Chapman visited the reservation in 
August 1994 and interviewed some of the MRS opponents. According to Chapman, the dogs 
and horses of one MRS opponent were killed and his children were assaulted. Soon after, 
President Chino wrote letters to the CORNELL DAILY SUN and to Cornell's President, Frank 
Rhodes, challenging Chapman's qualifications to write about the Mescalero controversy. Id. 
904 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL [Vol.36 
Despite three years of studies and negotiations by the tribal 
council, few details about the MRS were made available to tribal 
members, and the council held no public hearings during the negotiations 
with the utilities. While the tribal council signed the Letter of Intent with 
the utilities in December 1994,112 it was not until January 16, 1995 that 
a small notice appeared announcing that a referendum on the MRS might 
soon be held. On January 25, tribal members were notified that a public 
meeting would be held the next day and that a referendum would be 
held on January 31.113 The only document released at the public 
meeting was a two-page summary of the Letter of Intent.114 The Letter 
of Intent itself was not available to tribal members, and the summaries 
provided did not highlight some of the key parts of the Letter of Intent. 
For example, the Letter provided that a nine-member Board of Directors 
would control the Facility Corporation that would have run the MRS. 
Five Board members would be from the utilities and only four would be 
from the Tribe.115 This could have worked against the Tribe's interest, 
since "for all matters relating to the governance and management of the 
Facility Corporation, a majority of the votes of the Directors present is 
required to act."116 Another provision of the Letter of Intent not men-
tioned in the public documents released by the Tribe was that title to the 
spent fuel could pass from the utilities to the Tribe provided there was 
approval by the Tribal Council.117 
The first referendum went against the MRS, 490 to 362, and one 
could argue that this is evidence that the leadership did not coerce the 
Tribe.118 But it was the tribal leadership, dissatisfied with the outcome, 
that initiated the petition drive for a revote, allowed under the Mescalero 
112. The Letter of Intent, signed December 20, 1994, contained several provisions that 
were at variance with the original business plan of March 1994. Most importantly, the 
capacity of the facility was expanded from '10,000 to 20,000 metric tons, with an option to 
hold as much as 40,000 metric tons. 
113. See Mescalero Tribe Holds General Meeting for Tribal Members to Ask Questions about 
the Temporary Spent Fuel Storage Project Oan. 26, 1995) (Press release: Mescalero Utility Fuel 
Storage Initiative). 
114. Hanson, supra note 40. 
115. Letter of Intent, supra note 40, at 9. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 5. The Letter of Intent also stated that the Tribe and utilities would seek an 
NRC license for an MRS with a capacity of 40,000 metric tons, substantially higher than the 
original business plan called for. The Letter stated that written approval of the Tribal 
Council would be needed to accept spent fuel above 20,000 metric tons and that with 
approval of the Tribal Council and a Tribal referendum, an NRC license to expand capacity 
beyond 40,000 metric tons could be sought. Id. at 11, n. 15. 
118. According to Don Hancock of the Southwest Research and Information Center, no 
one has ever claimed that the first referendum, opposing the facility, was anything but free 
and fair. See Hancock, supra note 63, at 108. 
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Constitution if thirty percent of eligible voters petition to do so.119 
While the leadership characterized the petition drive as a grassroots 
movement,120 it was orchestrated by Fred I<aydahzinne, the 
Chino-appointed tribal housing director who controls 60 percent of the 
housing on the reservation and whose power to grant or deny housing 
to families could be seen as undermining a fair voting process. 
I<aydahzinne deployed 20 on-duty tribal employees to gather signatures 
for the petition.121 According to Rufina Laws, "[i)t was real hard for 
people to tum him down."122 Laws estimated that up to 90 percent of 
members opposed the facility,123 and she maintained that the second, 
affirmative vote could be explained as a failure of the democratic process: 
'We don't have any checks or balances in our tribal constitution. And the 
tribal council is just more or less a rubber stamp. I hear about city coun-
cils where they have conflicts and people argue things and after a while 
the majority rules. That's not what happened here."124 
Another issue that calls into question the legitimacy of the voting 
and raises ethical concerns is whether the Tribe ever had adequate 
information to make a collective decision on the MRS. The tribal 
leadership certainly was informed in that it received study grants from 
the ONWN, hired outside technical consultants, and traveled to other 
nuclear facilities.125 Its main technical consultant and spokesman, Miller 
Hudson, was a former official with Pacific Nuclear Corporation,126 and 
it is still unclear whether the leadership sought out opposing views on 
the MRS. Apart from the leadership, other members of .the Tribe were 
less informed and had few independent sources of information.127 Their 
119. See, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFA~, REVISED CONSTJ.TIJriON 
OF THE MESCALERO APACHE TRIBE OF THE MESCALERO INDIAN REsERVATION (approved Mar. 
25, 1936, revised Jan. 12, 1965) in Erickson et al., supra note 7, at 91. 
120. See Johnson, supra note 24, at 6. 
121. See Hanson, supra note 40. 
122. Johnson, supra note 24, at 6. 
123. See Hanson, supra note 40. 
124. Johnson, supra note 24, at 6. 
125. According to Fred Peso, the Tribe's Vice President, tribal leaders traveled to Wash-
ington on a number of occasions and met with radiation health staff at the National Insti-
tutes of Health, Nuclear Regulatory Commission officials, and staff at DOE's Office of 
Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. See Fred Peso Testimony, supra note 14. 
126. In an interview, Hudson said Pacific Nuclear could stand to make large profits on 
the Mescalero MRS beca1,15e it manufactures nuclear waste containers. Nuclear power plants 
across the United States might have had to use Pacific Nuclear's containers in order to meet 
the standards of t~e Mescalero MRS. See Erlich, supra note 39, at 8. 
127. In an interview, Rufina Laws said that in 1993 she requested that the tribal leaders 
allow a public hearing on the pros and cons of nuclear waste involving Indian leaders from 
other reservations. Mescalero tribal leaders did not want outsiders on the reservation, Laws 
said, ''but I said 'How can we possibly debate this issue when there isn't a person in here 
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avenues of information included an MRS Newsletter issued by the tribal 
council twice monthly128 and an information center on tll.e MRS that 
was established by the tribal council in an old laundromat.129 In this 
light, activities of outside environmental groups could be viewed not as 
meddlesome and paternalistic but as. an effort to provide a balance of 
views to the tribal members. 
The Mescalero decision-making process should not be idealized 
as ~nsensual, deliberative democracy. If there had been a fair vote in 
favor of the facility, it would be more problematic to oppose the MRS on 
ethical grounds. But there appears to have been some degree of intimida-
tion and information control by the leadership that reversed the initial 
vote and swayed the final outcome. This is one of the most serious ethical 
charges that can be brought in the context of the MRS proposal. 
The Mescalero decision-making process on the MRS calls into 
question whether voting is the best way for communities to express their 
will regarding facility siting. Should we be satisfied with a 51 percent 
majority in voting on hazardous facilities, or is a greater "super-majority'' 
needed? How should the will of a community be measured, and do 
governing institutions allow the will of the people to be expressed? It 
should be acknowledged, for example, that the United States Senate was 
created to temper, modify, and balance the "will of the people" as 
expressed in the House of Representatives.130 
One possible objection to these criticisms of the Mescalero voting 
process is that outsiders do not have a right to question how others 
govern themselves. According to Michael Gerrard: 
Traditional Western notions of democracy are confounded 
when assessing the nature of tribal consent to a hazardous 
facility. In some tribes, the governing body is elected by the 
members of the tribe, but other tribes are governed at least in 
part by hereditary leaders or by theocracies . . . . Outsiders 
who try to challenge the legitimacy of a decision made by a 
tribal council find themselves in the awkward, if not untena-
ble, position of attacking the way a different culture has come 
who knows a thing about nuclear waste, except what you've heard, and I'm sure you've 
heard the positive side of it."' Enson, supra note 108, at 150. The meeting was eventually 
allowed, and several Native American environmentalists from around the country came to 
the reservation to speak out against the MRS. Laws. said only 150 Tribe members came to 
the meeting and attributed the low turnout to the fact that the tribal government would not 
allow Tribe members to take administrative leave from their jobs to attend. ld. 
128. Fred Peso Testimony, supra note 14. 
129. Wald, supra note 48, at A18. 
130. See .THE FEDERALIST Nos. 62, 63 Qames Madison). 
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to govern itsel£.131 
This objection may be countered by the fact that the opposition 
to the MRS and to the tactics used by the leadership came from within 
the Tribe. The decision-making process in the context of the MRS was not 
so much a matter of tribal "culture" as a subversion of true deliberation 
and consensus-building. 
EXTERNALITIES 
A further question raised by this discussion of voting is who 
should have a say in the decision about whether to host a hazardous 
facility. The number of people that may be harmed by a given facility is 
usually greater than the number of people in the immediate community. 
Economists define an externality as "[t]he effect of one party's economic 
activities on another party that is not taken into account by the price sys-
tem."132 In this case, the residents surrounding the Mescalero reserva-
tion and thousands of residents of New Mexico would have suffered 
harms as a result of the facility but would not have been compensated for 
those harms. Potential harms included health and safety risks from 
accidents along transportation corridors as well as negative economic 
impacts and declining property values resulting from the public stigma 
associated with nuclear waste.133 · 
The externality argument against the MRS is a strong one, and it 
has many precedents. Nuisance law prevents individuals from using their 
private property in a manner that causes, or may cause, harm to 
neighbors. Municipal zoning laws are the most basic expression of this 
value; they typically prevent property owners from erecting structures 
such as factories, radio towers, or parking garages in residential 
neighborhoods because of the negative impact these structures would 
have on nearby property owners and a residential quality of life. 
The towns in the immediate vicinity of the Mescalero reservation 
are mountain resort towns that depend on tourism to s~tain their 
economies. The residents of Ruidoso, a town of 5,000 residents 30 miles 
from the proposed facility, were vociferous in their objections to the 
Mescalero MRS. As Ruidoso city councilman Frank Potter put it, 
[w)estern tourism and nuclear storage don't mix."134 
131. MICHAEL B. GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE RISK: FEAR AND FAIRNESS IN TOXIC 
NUCLEAR WASTE SITING 137 (1994). 
132. WALTER NICHOLSON, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND rrs APPLICATION 708 (6th 
ed. 1994). 
133. See EASTERLING &; KUNREUTHER, supra note 4, at 137. 
134. Wald, supra note 48, at Al8. 
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The State of New Mexico was strongly opposed to the MRS as 
well, 135 and state officials used the language of externalities to express 
their objections. John McKean, spokesman for former New Mexico 
Governor Bruce King, argued: ''While these activities are on Indian lands, 
they have an effect on their non-Indian neighbors .... At some point, the 
interests of non-Indian neighbors need to be figured into the equa-
tion."136 David Dale, a New Mexico environmentalist, echoed this 
sentiment: "The Tribe is being run by the power companies. The whole 
sovereign-rights issue is a central problem. How can a small unit of 
400,000 acres, with 3,000 people ... be sovereign and throw their weight 
against the 1.6 million residents of New Mexico?"137 
The negative impacts that New Mexico residents were concerned 
about included transportation risks and the public stigma attached to 
nuclear waste. This stigma, as well as opposition to nuclear facilities, has 
a long history.138 Public fears stem from real nuclear accidents, radiation 
releases, and an association with· nuclear weapons,139 as well as the 
invisibility and long-lived nature of radioactivity.140 These fears and 
concerns can translate into real economic impacts for communities 
associated with nuclear waste.141 
In a 1992 New Mexico case (City of Santa Fe v. Komis), a state 
court awarded a landowner $337,000 for losses because a road being built 
near the property will be used for high level nuclear waste shipments to 
DOE's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant near Carlsbad. The New Mexico 
Supreme Court upheld the ruling, noting that "if people will not 
purchase property because they fear living or working on or near a WIPP 
route, or if a buyer can be found, but only at a reduced price, a loss of 
value exists" and "the landowner should be compensated."142 This rul-
ing could have provided precedent for protracted litigation had the 
Mescalero MRS proceeded. 
135. In 1992, the New Mexico House passed "A Memorial Opposing a Proposed 
Monitored Retrievable Storage Facility in the State of New Mexico," N.M. H. Memorial 66, 
40th Leg., 2d Sess., (1992). In 1993, the New Mexico Senate passed "A Memorial Opposing 
Establishment of a Monitored Retrievable Storage Facility in the State Of New Mexico," 
N.M. S. Memorial 4, 40th Leg., 2d Sess., (1993). 
136. Bryce, supra note 32, at 6. 
137. ld. 
138. See Eugene A. Rosa & William R. Freudenberg, The Historical Development of Public 
Reactions to Nuclear Power: Implications for Nuclear Waste Policy, in PUBuc REACTIONS TO 
NUCLEAR WASTE 32 (Riley E. Dunlap ed., 1993). 
139. See FLYNN ET AL., supra note 54, at 12. 
140. See EAs'rERUNG & KUNREUTHBR, supra note 4, at 132. 
141. FLYNN ET AL., supra note 54, at 65. 
142. City of Santa Fe v. Komis, 845 P.2d 753, 756-57 (N.M. 1992). The Waste Isolation Pilot 
Plant is the proposed permanent underground repository for transuranic waste from U.S. 
weapons production. 
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In another example of economic impacts, Easterling and 
Kunreuther surveyed convention planners in 1988 as to how they would 
rank Las Vegas in choosing a convention site based on news reports 
about Yucca Mountain, which is approximately 100 miles from Las Vegas. 
They found that 32 percent of convention planners would lower their 
ranking of Las Vegas among convention sites if Yucca Mountain opened 
and that 7.8 percent would no longer consider Las Vegas.143 Under a 
scenario of a minor acddent at Yucca Mountain that was "amplified" by 
significant media attention, 46.2 percent of convention planners would 
lower their ranking and 14.1 percent would no longer consider Las 
Vegas.144 Easterling and Kunreuther estimated that the Las Vegas 
convention industry could suffer losses between $173 million and $450 
million in the year after Yucca Mountain opened and more if there were 
an acddent at Yucca Mountain.145 
This survey and other experiences with hazardous waste facilities 
suggests that the economic concerns of communities near the Mescalero 
reservation with respect to tourism and property values were justi-
fied.146 In theory, surrounding communities in New. Mexico could have 
been compensated for the economic harms and health risks stemming 
from the MRS. Such a compensation scheme could have involved 
drawing concentric circles around the reservation, with compensation 
decreasing as distance from the MRS increases. It may even have been 
possible to conduct surveys of how much money would have been 
needed to be offered people to live a specified distance from an MRS. 
According to Michael Gerrard, however, "[t]he state of the art in 
quantifying the externalities from waste disposal facilities is extremely 
crude.".147 Compensating New Mexico residents is plausible in theory 
but totally unworkable in practice. Citizens will tend to overstate their 
perceived damages to obtain payment, and the externality problem can 
never be perfectly remedied because there is always a marginal resident 
who lives just beyond the proposed limit of compensation. At some point 
a line must be drawn, possibly very conservatively, or else every facility 
siting proposal will be held up by the monetary and time expense of 
working out regional compensation. Nevertheless, the potential harms to 
143. See Douglas Easterling & Howard Kunreuther, The Vulnerability of the Convention 
Industry to a High-level Nuclear Waste Repository, in I'UBUC REACI'IONS TO NUCLEAR WASTE 
209,222 (Riley E. Dunlap ed., 1993). 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 227. 
146. Of course, the Mescalero themselves would be subject to this stigma, and it is likely 
that tourist interest in their ski resort and hotel/ casino would decline if the MRS opened. 
This point is often overlooked in discussions of the case. 
147. GERRARD, supra note 131, at 72. 
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New Mexico residents should at least weigh in a moral calculus about the 
project, though they may not be quantifiable enough to be factored into 
an economic calculus. 
One of the most interesting political questions in siting disputes, 
and an issue that will become increasingly prominent in the future, is 
whether regional communities affected by externalities can organize to 
block a proposed project.148 In the case of the Mescalero MRS, New 
Mexico officials probably would have had enough tools at their disposal 
to block the construction of an MRS. The state controlled issuance of 
environmental permits and could have tied up the MRS in the courts for 
years. In addition, the state's delegation in Washington supports its 
position.149 · 
BURDEN SHARING AND GEOGRAPHIC EQUITY 
Two additional arguments used by New Mexico deserve further 
analysis. The first was that New Mexico has already done its share for 
U.S. nuclear programs, as it hosts Los Alamos National Laboratory, 
Sandia National Laboratory, and the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant for the 
nation's transuranic wastes.150 This argument for burden sharing has 
some merit, although it had less force when the MRS became a private 
venture compared to when the federal government was attempting to site 
an MRS. Moreover, New Mexico historically has touted Los Alamos and 
Sandia as high-tech engines of economic prosperity rather than economic 
and environmental burdens. 
The second argument used by the state was that it is unfair to 
construct an MRS in New Mexico because most of the nuclear reactors in 
the United States are in the East and New Mexico did not create any of 
the waste that would be stored in the MRS (New Mexico has no civilian 
148. Upon his departure from the ONWN, David Leroy issued a transition report that 
urged that supplemental funding be made available to cities, counties, or states near 
potential MRS host sites so that these jurisdictions could obtain their own information. 
Leroy suggested that this could potentially have softened their opposition to an MRS. See 
Elaine Hiruo &: Dave Airozo, Leroy Resigns Negotiator Post, O'Leary Fills in Until Stallings 
Tapped, NUCLEAR FuEL, June 21, 1993, at 3. 
149. Melinda Kassen, an attorney with the Environmental Defense Fund, explained that 
while states have "no direct power to block a volunteer site on tribal lands ... state envi-
ronmental and health protection laws can serve as barriers to the site obtaining all of the 
permits and infrastructure necessary for smooth operation of an MRS, (and] a hostile state 
could significantly slow completion of the [MRS] facility." Melinda Kassen, Siting the MRS-A 
Lesson in Huw Even Bribe's Don't Work, 7 NAT. RESOURCES &: ENv. 16, 19 (1993). 
150. See Carter, supra note 19. 
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nuclear power plants).151 This same argument has been used repeatedly 
by Nevadans in opposing Yucca Mountain as a geologic repository.152 
The argument for geographic equity has some problems, 
however. Present nuclear waste storage policy calls for consolidation of 
nuclear waste into a repository, and perhaps one or two centralized 
storage facilities may be built in the interim. Even if the locations for all 
these facilities were in the eastern United States, nearby communities and 
the host states would bear the cost of the facilities while other eastern 
states with nuclear generating capacity would receive the benefits. An 
MRS built in New York or Pennsylvania, for example, would impose 
burdens on the residents of those states, while the residents of other 
nuclear generating states such as Illinois or Virginia would bear no 
burdens. 
Nuclear waste facilities, and hazardous facilities in general, 
impose local burdens and generalized benefits. This geographic imbalance 
can never really be restored, even with elaborate wealth transfer schemes. 
It becomes hopelessly muddled to attempt to draw the geographic lines 
and trace the economic ripples to determine which ·communities are 
getting benefits from nuclear technology and which are bearing the costs. 
The reason arguments about geographic equity and burden 
sharing can become complicated is that they are based on three seemingly 
laudable but contradictory objectives: 
1. Areas that enjoy the benefits from waste generation should 
bear the costs of disposal; 
2. No place should bear an inordinate burden for environmen-
tal hazards; and 
3. Facilities should be placed in the technically best location to 
minimize health and environmental impacts.153 
These goals can be contradictory, because if the first principle is 
followed and chemical waste landfills are located near chemical factories 
and nuclear waste storage facilities are located near reactors, the second 
principle is often violated. The third principle most often implies that 
hazardous facilities should be located far away from densely populated 
areas, but locating facilities in rural areas (sometimes decried as rural 
discrimination) can contradict the first principle.154 
151. See Elaine Hiruo, Mescaleros Want to Begin Talks on Siting Spent Fuel Facility, 
NUCLEONICS WEEK, August 12, 1993, at 1. 
152. E.ASTERUNC &t KUNREUrHER, supra note 4, at 143. 
153. GERRARD, supra note 131, at 84. 
154. ld. 
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In sum, then, arguments against the MRS based on geography 
and burden sharing were not among the strongest that were made 
against the MRS, especially after the MRS became a private venture. 
CONCLUSION 
The difficult questions of environmental ethics raised by the 
Mescalero proposal to host an MRS lie at the heart of the heated passions 
it aroused. What was at stake in the proposal were core ethical values 
such as self-determination, democratic consent, procedural and 
distributional equity, compensation for harms, and political sovereignty. 
Determining the comparative value among the myriad arguments 
advanced in favor of and against the MRS is not merely an academic 
exercise. The likelihood of future battles over siting hazardous facilities, 
possibly involving Native Americans, argues for a careful evaluation of 
claims so that policy makers may avoid situations in which emotion 
overpowers rational decision-making. Similarly, opponents of such 
facilities, by restricting their arguments to sound ethical principles, may 
avoid becoming the unwanted protectors of communities who believe a 
project is in their interests. 
The most compelling arguments against the Mescalero MRS were 
that it harmed U.S. nuclear waste disposal policy and that there was a 
strong likelihood that the Tribe voted for the facility under some amount 
of duress and intimidation by its leadership. In addition, the apparent 
targeting of Indian tribes by the federal government to host an MRS 
raised ethical concerns given the history of harm imposed on Indians by 
government nuclear programs. If the issues of compensation and 
economic justice are considered separately, however, it would be very 
difficult to dismiss the proposal as economic exploitation of a poor 
community by wealthy . utilities. Respecting a community means 
respecting its right to make economic decisions for itself. 
The political battle over the Mescalero MRS and the divisions it 
caused within the Tribe are further evidence of the social conflicts that 
have always surrounded nuclear waste storage and disposal. Reforming 
the present course of U.S. nuclear waste policy not only requires technical 
know-how but also a sensitivity to some of the ethical and social values 
that have been described in this article. 
